Massachusetts Premises Liability Funding

Three years from the date of injury for a negligence claim (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A).

Massachusetts applies modified comparative negligence with a 51% bar (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85). Massachusetts abolished the rigid invitee/licensee distinction through case law, not by the statute sometimes cited for this point: Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973), merged the two categories and imposed a single duty of reasonable care under all the circumstances on a property owner toward anyone lawfully on the premises, regardless of whether they were there as a business invitee or a social guest. Trespassers generally remain a separate, lesser-duty category, subject to a specific statutory exception for child trespassers and artificial conditions (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85Q). For negligent security specifically, Massachusetts courts have been comparatively cautious about extending an affirmative duty: Whittaker v. Saraceno, 418 Mass. 196, 635 N.E.2d 1185 (1994), held that a landlord does not generally owe tenants or their guests a duty to protect against the criminal acts of third parties merely by virtue of the landlord-tenant relationship, absent a specific undertaking, a heightened relationship, or particular knowledge of the danger.

No general statutory cap on economic or non-economic damages in an ordinary premises-liability claim.

Mandatory at 12% per year from the date the cause of action arose, under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 6B — a notably higher and more certain rate than most other states, which do not award pre-judgment interest on unliquidated tort damages at all.

Proper in the county where the defendant resides or where the claim arose (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223, § 1).

Massachusetts has no dedicated consumer litigation funding statute. No statutory cap.

What did Mounsey v. Ellard actually change, and what does an "abolished by statute" framing get wrong?

Mounsey v. Ellard is a 1973 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision, not a statute — it merged the licensee and invitee categories into a single reasonable-care duty. The statute sometimes associated with this point, ch. 231, § 85Q, actually addresses a landowner's liability to child trespassers for artificial conditions, a related but separate doctrine.

The practical effect for a funding evaluation is the same either way: a business invitee and a social guest are owed the same duty of reasonable care in Massachusetts, so the visitor's precise reason for being on the property matters less than in a state that still separates those two categories, though trespassers generally remain a distinct, lower-duty category outside the child-trespasser exception.

Why is Whittaker v. Saraceno a more demanding standard than some other states' negligent security rules?

Whittaker held that a landlord does not automatically owe a duty to protect against third-party crime simply by virtue of the landlord-tenant relationship — Massachusetts requires a specific undertaking, a heightened relationship, or particular knowledge of the danger.

That makes evidence of a specific prior threat, a security measure the landlord previously promised or provided and then withdrew, or direct notice of a dangerous individual or pattern more valuable in Massachusetts than the kind of general area-crime evidence that can support a claim in a state like New Jersey.

How does mandatory 12% pre-judgment interest affect a Massachusetts claim's timeline incentives?

Because interest accrues automatically at 12% per year from the date the claim arose, both sides face a compounding, predictable cost tied directly to how long the case remains unresolved.

This is a materially higher and more certain rate than most states, which award no pre-judgment interest on unliquidated tort damages at all, and it applies regardless of how fact-intensive the underlying negligent-security investigation turns out to be.