Texas Slip and Fall Accident Funding

Two years from the date of the fall for a premises-liability/negligence claim (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003). Texas treats slip-and-fall as ordinary negligence for limitations purposes rather than defining a distinct premises-liability period.

Texas applies modified comparative responsibility with a 51% bar: a plaintiff found 51% or more responsible recovers nothing (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.001). Texas premises law layers a duty-of-care and knowledge framework on top of that bar. A property owner owes an invitee a duty to protect against or warn of unreasonably dangerous conditions the owner actually knew about or should have discovered through reasonable inspection, an "actual or constructive knowledge" test articulated in Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. 1983). Constructive knowledge specifically requires evidence the hazard existed long enough that a reasonably prudent operator would have discovered it — the "time-notice" rule from CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. 2000) — which is often the central, most heavily litigated fact question in a Texas slip-and-fall case.

No statutory cap on economic or non-economic damages in an ordinary premises-liability slip-and-fall case.

Pre-judgment interest generally accrues beginning roughly 180 days after the earlier of the claim notice date or the filing of suit, running until the date of judgment, at rates set under Tex. Fin. Code §§ 304.104–304.108.

Proper in the county of the defendant's residence or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including the accident location (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002).

Texas has no dedicated consumer litigation funding statute. No statutory cap.

Why is the "time-notice" rule so central to funding a Texas slip-and-fall claim?

Texas requires proof the hazard existed long enough for a reasonable operator to have discovered and remedied it before the plaintiff's fall. Cases with clear video or log evidence of duration underwrite faster and more confidently than cases relying on circumstantial inference about how the hazard arose.

Under CMH Homes v. Daenen, a plaintiff cannot rely on the mere fact of a fall to establish notice. There must instead be specific evidence bearing on how long the condition was present, which makes early case evaluation heavily dependent on surveillance footage retention, incident-report timestamps, and employee inspection schedules.

How does the 51% bar interact with a disputed "open hazard" defense?

A defendant arguing the hazard was obvious is functionally arguing for allocation of responsibility above 51%, which would eliminate the plaintiff's recovery entirely rather than merely reduce it. That makes the fault allocation itself, not just the underlying liability, a determinative underwriting question in Texas.

Texas juries assign a responsibility percentage to each party in the case. A plaintiff found primarily responsible for failing to notice an obvious condition recovers nothing, which makes Texas materially less forgiving than pure comparative-fault states whenever the obviousness of the hazard is a genuinely live dispute.

Does the duty owed differ between commercial and residential property owners?

The invitee standard generally applies to customers of commercial premises, while a residential guest's legal status — invitee or licensee — affects the specific duty the owner owes. Commercial defendants are held to routine-inspection expectations that shape the constructive-knowledge analysis differently than a private residence would.

Grocery, retail, and restaurant defendants typically face a more developed body of Texas case law on inspection frequency and self-service risk. A residential premises case, by contrast, often turns on duty questions tied to the visitor's specific legal status on the property rather than a documented inspection routine.